Are you an accidental drug smuggler?

No? Don't be so sure. That shipment of jeans could be a conduit for drug traffickers to smuggle narcotics into the country. It happened to Fruit of the Loom.

The case

On Sept. 1, 1998, law enforcement officials in the Bluegrass State seized 5,200 pounds of marijuana from a shipment of T-shirts from Jamaica bound for the Fruit of the Loom plant in Jamestown, Ky. The cargo was unloaded at Jacksonville and shipped by truck to Jamestown.

Workers at the Jamestown plant found the drugs; the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and Louisville police arrived almost immediately.

We knew it was there, says Paul Chambers, resident agent-in-charge for Customs investigations in Kentucky. He declined to say who had provided the tip: Of course, we're not going to divulge that.

He confirmed that the T-shirts and the marijuana were in a 40-foot container; the pot had been compressed into bricks, wrapped in duct tape and coated with grease (to fool the drug-sniffing dogs).

Obviously, it was a deal gone bad,' Chambers says. The two-and-a-half tons of marijuana weren't meant to be offloaded in midday, downtown Jamestown. Something - or someone - was supposed to get it before it got there. We want to find out what.'

At press time, the investigation was still underway. No arrests had been made and no fines levied. And no one is above suspicion - including Fruit of the Loom employees and employees of the shipper (he declined to identify the carrier).

Rumors

Such stories throw the industry into a tailspin. Rumors were flying in the weeks following the bust. Some claimed that the contraband was cocaine (it was pot) and that it arrived via Miami (it was Jacksonville). One rumor identified a shipper - a shipper with no northbound traffic out of Jamaica.

Rumors indicate concern, but Chambers says concern must translate into action. Anti-smuggling efforts must be a conscious corporate decision.

The textile industries are very vulnerable, especially with the increase of global trade, he warns. And you're vulnerable to people within your companies and to those people who are handling your material, including shippers, freight forwarders, packers and distribution locations.

In the Kentucky bust, the drugs could have been put in the shipment at any point. We're trying to find out who put it in, where it was put in . Who paid for it? Who's going to profit? Who had command and control over that container? That's what we have to investigate," he explains. We have to look at the complete cycle.

Someone on the inside knew something: The term we use is internal conspiracy, he says. You've got truckers in Jamaica and the United States. You've got longshoremen - you've got people that are handling on the vessel there are a lot of handoffs."

He explains employees who work in ports sometimes form sophisticated smuggling organizations. They are in unique positions to manipulate cargo, conveyances, baggage, etc.

For example, a legitimate shipment may contain 60 boxes, but the invoice says 50. The extra 10 boxes contain drugs, which are removed by the conspirators. Another approach: they remove unmanifested luggage containing contraband before the Customs inspection. South Florida had been a particular target - especially Miami.

So, now that you know about these gangs, ask yourself: Do you know who has access to your goods? Are you sure?

(Editor's note: In the next issue of AIM, look for specific strategies on how to implement such controls, including questions to ask your shippers - the same questions Customs asks.)

SCIA: Insurance or false comfort?

Like apparel manufactures, most legitimate carriers want to do their part to deter smuggling. Most cooperate with Customs and are members of the Sea Carrier (or the slightly stricter Super Carrier) Initiative Agreement (SCIA). The program, established in 1984 is designed to discourage narcotic smugglers from using commercial carriers to transport contraband.

Is it effective? Or is it like the airport x-ray machine, a comforting site with little effect on a truly dedicated criminal? Before carriers can participate, they undergo rigorous inspections, says Politis. SCIA is not a shoe-in, he explains.

Participants agree to enhance security at foreign terminals, aboard their vessels and at their domestic facilities. They are subject to addition scrutiny on everything from employees to customers.

They must cooperate with Customs in identifying and reporting suspected smuggling. In fact, George Estevez, director of apparel trade, Crowley American Transport, notes that shippers are often the first to tip off customs about suspected contraband.

So if it's such a pain, why do shippers join? It's a quid pro quo arrangement that includes the following benefits.

Training. Customs agrees to provide training to carriers' employees in the areas of baggage and cargo security, cargo profiling, personnel security and vessel and aircraft search.

Cheaper insurance. Insurers promote it, and according to Customs, often offer lower rates to participants.

Special consideration if drugs are found. SCIA participants obtain favorable treatment for potential fines if security is breached and illegal drugs are found on board. Customs gives them some consideration, explains Chambers. It becomes a mitigating factor in the assessment of any penalty.

Quick passage. Signatories get released fairly automatically at the border, Politis confirms. Customs may check them once in a while, but if the shipper has met SCIA criteria, generally shipments will not be held up at the border."

This final advantage could backfire. Easy boarder crossings may be a mixed blessing - at least according to one customs official who said that SCIA could create a false sense of security.

No Customs representative would go on the record identifying how often shippers are inspected or what kind of enforcement is in place. Off the record, one official said that few - if any - inspections occurred once a carrier signed the agreement. Maybe they signed the agreement because it gives them a pass. The onus, according to the official, falls back on the manufacturer.

"If this is important and the industry is concerned, [the industry] needs to prioritize. They need to make a conscious corporate decision that they don't want this [smuggling] to happen to them," Chambers contends. "Internal controls have to be implemented."

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